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		Louise	Lee		
Abstract	Critics	have	often	noted	Darwin’s	enthusiastic	curiosity	(Beer,	Levine,	Amigoni,	Schmitt,	Browne)	 in	 the	 Journal	 of	 Researches	 (1839)—particularly	 its	 “intensely	 libidinous”	nature	(Beer)—but	his	“strange	antics”	and	numerous	 instances	of	“amusement”	have	been	treated	as	little	more	than	biographical	gloss,	or	charming	digressions	on	the	way	to	a	much	larger	story.	But	re-reading	these	understatedly	comic	episodes	through	the	interpretive	prism	of	incongruity	produces	a	new	set	of	emphases;	and	intellectual	and	affective	affinities.	For,	like	Michel	Foucault’s	laughter	at	the	beginning	of	The	Order	of	
Things	 (1966),	 Darwin’s	 “scientific	 wit”	 has	 distinctly	 taxonomic	 implications.1	Incongruity	figures	the	splicing	of	two	previously	un-apprehended	interpretive	frames,	a	kink	 in	 the	 logic	 of	 expectation.	 While	 Darwin	 later	 naturalizes	 (rather	 than	spectacularizes)	incongruity	into	his	scientific	method,	in	its	first	iteration	in	the	Journal,	it	performs	vital	cultural	and	aesthetic	work:	upturning	sublimity	and	delivering	detail	and	 present-ness	 rather	 than	 vastness	 and	 transcendental	 awe.	 	 Building	 on	 Arthur	Koestler’s	 theory	 of	 “bisociation”,	 I	 argue	 that	 incongruity—a	 gentlemanly	 and	Enlightenment	theory	of	comedy	that	is	fundamentally	horizontal	rather	than	vertical	in	its	purview—operates	by	making	Darwin’s	own	previous	expectations,	rather	than	any	object,	animal	or	person,	the	butt	of	the	joke.	The	“clash”	of	comic	frames	at	the	point	of	observation	 limns	 incongruity’s	usefulness	as	a	 form	of	visually	 self-stimulating	agon.	These	“shifts	of	attention”	(Koestler),	I	propose,	have	significant	implications	in	his	early	evolutionary	theorizing:	gesturing	towards	Darwin’s	own	“nonsense”	aesthetic:	one	that	is	highly	suggestive	of	non-essentialist	approaches	to	species	thinking.		
                                                        
1 An	elliptical	phrase	which	is	mentioned,	but	not	elaborated	on,	in	S	T	Coleridge’s	1836	Lecture	IX	“On	the	Distinctions	of	the	Witty,	the	Droll,	The	Odd	and	the	Humorous.”	See	Henry	Nelson	Coleridge,	The	Literary	Remains	of	Samuel	Taylor	Coleridge,	vol.	I,	William	Pickering,	1836.	
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I.	Against	Laughter;	Or	“How	We	Encourage	Research”		What	is	the	function	of	laughter	in	the	production	of	knowledge?	What	does	it	mean	to	break	 into	hilarity,	 to	snort,	 to	snigger,	 to	guffaw	or	 laugh	 inwardly:	does	 it	connote	a	moment	 of	 intellectual	 vacuity—or	 potency?	 In	 the	 information-saturated	 world	 of	twenty-first	century	late	capitalism,	laughter	is,	of	course,	everywhere:	both	opiate	and	stimulus,	 raucously	 erupting	 from	 our	 screens,	 from	 digital	 LOL-culture,	 to	 stand-up	comedy,	to	TV	sit-coms	and	Skype.	Not	only	in	staged	settings	do	we	laugh—in	cinemas,	clubs	and	theatres—but	in	daily	life,	on	the	weekday	commute,	via	twitter,	or	at	coffee	machines,	 we	 laugh	 both	 quietly	 and	 uproariously,	 both	 inappropriately	 and	appropriately.	Laughter	can	be	congenial	and	smooth—about	social	politesse—but	also,	alarmingly	 bodily,	 involving	 rictus	 and	 even,	 wetness.	 Yet	 alongside	 this	 sometime	viscerality,	laughter	can	also	prove	trickily	thought-provoking,	leaving	resonant	traces	in	the	 memory.	 In	 Elizabeth	 Bishop’s	 poem	 “The	 Wit”	 (1956),	 she	 describes	 the	“thunderclap	 of	 laughter”	 but	 then—after	 the	 explosion	 has	 subsided—the	 “spaces,	after”;	these	pauses	to	be	re-visited	or	re-consummated	into	an	unknown	future	(Bishop	198;	 Bevis	6).	 In	 these	 and	 other	moments,	 laughter	 appears,	 rather	 than	 emptied	 of	meaningful	 content,	 almost	 exactly	 the	 reverse:	 provocatively	 and	 inexorably	 idea-forming.	It	is	the	reason	perhaps,	that	“getting”	a	joke	feels	like	solving	a	problem	or	that	comic	reversals	often	present	as	epistemological	ones.		But	 despite	 laughter’s	 unsettling	 capacity	 to	 disrupt	 and	 complicate	 a	 line	 of	thinking,	 it	 has	 suffered	 as	 the	 historic	 poor	 relation	 to	 seriousness	 in	 post-Enlightenment	debates	about	intellectual	and	cultural	formation.	Walter	Hipple’s	seminal	work	 on	 aesthetics	 postulates	 the	 observation,	 oft-made	 since,	 that	 the	 ludicrous—defined	by	the	OED	as	“capable	of	arousing	laughter,	funny,	comic,	amusing,	absurd	[and]	silly”—was	an	 ignored	or	underrated	category	 in	debates	of	 the	 eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	century	(Hipple	113;	qtd	in	Olsen	25).	While	discussions	raged,	for	example,	about	the	infinitely	incalculable	and	nuanced	effects	of	the	sublime	on	subjectivity	and	mental	 causation,	 laughter’s	 cognitive	 potential	 was	 given	 decidedly	 shorter	 shrift.	Immanuel	Kant’s	brief	addendum	on	laughter	to	 the	passages	on	beauty	 in	Critique	of	
Judgment	 (1790)	 is	 a	 case	 in	 point.	 Contributing	 the	 original	 insight	 that	 laughter	 is	triggered	 by	 a	 “sudden”	 incongruity	 i.e.	 a	 mismatch	 of	 intellectual	 processing,	 Kant	
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proffers	the	corollary	explanation	that	laughter	occurs	as	a	result	of	the	“transformation	of		tense	expectation	into	nothing.”	Yet	a	telos	of	nothingness	and	insubstantiality	governs	Kantian	and	some	(though,	not	all)	German	idealist	writing	about	laughter,	engendering	separatisms	between	 levity	and	gravity	still	evident	 in	modern	scholarship	(Kant	161;	Berger	15-37).	Critics	attempting	to	account	for	the	“extraordinary	conservatism”	of	some	early	nineteenth	century	writers	 towards	 laughter	as	a	disciplinary	mode,	have	conjectured	both	 frivolous	 and	 serious	 reasons	 (Connor,	 “Art,	 Criticism	 and	 Laughter”	 3).	 One	irresistible	inference,	as	Steven	Connor	suggests,	is	the	constitutional	inadequacy	of	some	philosophers	to	 fully	appreciate	a	 joke—and	certainly,	one	of	Kant’s	very	 few	quips	 in	
Critique	about	a	beer	bottle	is	grist	to	this	mirthless	mill:		 Suppose	that	some	one	tells	the	following	story:	an	Indian	at	an	Englishman's	table	in	Surat,	saw	a	bottle	of	ale	opened,	and	all	the	beer	turned	into	froth	and	flowing	out.	 The	 repeated	 exclamations	 of	 the	 Indian	 showed	 his	 great	 astonishment.	“Well,	what	is	so	wonderful	in	that?”	asked	the	Englishman.	“Oh,	I'm	not	surprised	myself”,	said	the	Indian,	“at	its	getting	out,	but	at	how	you	ever	managed	to	get	it	all	in”	(161).		“At	 this”	Kant	 describes,	 “we	 laugh	 and	 it	 gives	 us	hearty	 pleasure.”	 Setting	 aside	 the	universality—or	not—of	the	amusement	produced	by	this	scene,	it	is	highly	constitutive	of	the	way	that	laughter	is	cognitively	constrained	by	Kant’s	own	viewpoint.	The	fact	that	the	exchange	is	“comic”	in	the	first	place	rests	putatively	on	an	incongruity—a	kink	in	the	logic	of	expectation—although	actually,	and	despite	Kant’s	assurances	to	the	contrary,	its	strongest	underlying	force	is	a	racial	superiority	joke.	Kant’s	laughter	here	is	precipitated	by	the	momentary	realization	of	the	contrast	between	his	grandiose	expectations	of	what	causes	 the	 Indian’s	 astonishment,	 and	 the	 apparently	 banal	 reality	 of	 what	 actually	prompts	it.		But	 it	 is	 the	 end-product	 of	Kant’s	 joke,	 or	 rather	 the	 lack	 of	 it,	which	 is	 truly	noteworthy:	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 laughter	 are	 equated	 here	 with	 the	 action	 of	 the	overflowing	beer:	“the	bubble	of	our	expectation	was	extended	to	the	full	and	suddenly	burst	into	nothing”	(161).	The	spilt	beer	delimits	Kantian	laughter	in	a	decisive	way:	once	escaped	 from	 the	 bottle,	 it	 is	 gone,	 completed	 and	 cannot	 be	 returned.	 Kant	 treats	
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laughter	 here	 as	 cognitively	 summative	 rather	 than	 formative.	 There	 are	 no	 “spaces,	after”	nor	any	restive	urge	to	revisit	the	scene	in	the	imagination.	The	nullity	of	Kantian	laughter	is	again	foregrounded	in	another	passage	in	which	it	is	constructed	as	a	purely	physicalized	self-colloquy	that	by-passes	the	intellect	and	is	relegated	to	the	workings	of	digestive	system:		 [I]t	is	readily	intelligible	how	[…]	shifting	the	mind	now	to	one	standpoint	and	now	to	the	other,	to	enable	it	to	contemplate	its	object,	may	involve	a	corresponding	and	reciprocal	straining	and	slackening	of	the	elastic	parts	of	our	viscera,	which	communicates	itself	to	the	diaphragm	(and	resembles	that	felt	by	ticklish	people)	in	 the	 course	 of	 which	 the	 lungs	 expel	 the	 air	 with	 rapidly	 succeeding	interruptions,	resulting	 in	a	movement	beneficial	 to	health.	This	alone,	and	not	what	goes	on	in	the	mind,	is	the	proper	cause	of	the	gratification	in	a	thought	that	at	bottom	represents	nothing	(162-3).			While	Kant	does	at	 least	 locate	 laughter	within	the	“elastic”	parts	of	 the	body,	 it	 is	 an	interruption	 that,	while	health-inducing,	 is	nonetheless	borne	away	on	a	 thought	 that	“represents	 nothing.”	 The	 knock-out	 punch,	 though,	 that	 removes,	 almost	 entirely,	laughter’s	cognitive	agency,	is	delivered	by	G	W	F	Hegel,	who,	in	Aesthetics:	Lectures	on	
Fine	Art	(1835),	stakes	out	the	terms	of	the	laughing	world	as	so	exuberantly	cheerful—and	 so	 yet	 value-free	 and	 unimportant—that	 it	 simply	 does	 not	 matter	 what	 occurs	within	it.	Differentiating	between	the	“ridiculous”	that	produces	laughter	(and	that,	he	says,	 can	be	virtually	anything)	and	 the	 “comic”,	he	demarcates	 an	alternate	 laughing	universe	 that	operates	 something	 like	 a	 big	 facile	 bubble,	 brainlessly	 bobbing	 up	 and	down	alongside	the	real:			 Here	pretty	and	worthless	purposes	are	accomplished	with	an	appearance	of	great	seriousness	and	after	elaborate	preparations.	Yet,	after	these	purposes	collapse,	their	author	can	rise	up	from	his	fall	in	free	cheerfulness,	just	because	his	purposes	were	so	negligible	that	nothing	is	really	lost	when	they	fail	(qtd.	in	Berger	25).2	
                                                        2	I	am	indebted	to	Peter	Berger	for	his	translation,	and	for	also	his	incisive	discussion	of	the	difference	between	the	“comic”	and	the	“ridiculous”	in	Hegel’s	thinking.	See	Peter	L.	Berger,	 Redeeming	 Laughter:	 The	 Comic	 Dimension	 of	 Human	 Experience.	Walter	 de	
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	The	insulated	world	constructed	by	Hegel	here	removes	all	the	importance	of	any	lived	experience,	proffering	no	more	than	a	benign	simulacrum	of	the	actual,	with	none	of	the	serious	consequences.		In	 what	 follows,	 however,	 I	 suggest	 a	 different	 model	 of	 laughter	 to	 Kant’s	completed	acts,	and	to	Hegel’s	no-value	low-content	comic	universe,	and	argue	that	it	is	precisely	this	comic	exuberance	that	shaped	Charles	Darwin’s	experiential	world,	and	his	thinking	 in	 his	 first	 published,	 and	most	 literary	work,	 Journal	 of	 Researches	 (1839).	Critics	have	often	noted	Darwin’s	enthusiastic	curiosity	(Beer,	Levine,	Amigoni,	Schmitt,	Browne)	in	the	Journal,	particularly	its	“intensely	libidinous”	nature	(“Four	Bodies	on	the	Beagle”	 20),	 but	 his	 “strange	 antics”	 (Journal	 195)	 and	 numerous	 instances	 of	“amusement”	 have	 been	 treated	 as	 little	 more	 than	 biographical	 gloss,	 or	 charming	digressions	on	the	way	to	a	much	larger	story.	But	re-reading	these	understatedly	comic	episodes	through	the	interpretive	prism	of	incongruity	produces	a	new	set	of	emphases	and	intellectual	and	affective	affinities—with	distinctly	taxonomic	implications.		Before	that:	a	caveat.	In	making	this	case,	I	cut	across	an	increasingly	dominant	image	 in	 Victorian	 studies	 of	 the	 later	 mournful	 Darwin,	 almost	 Christ-like	 in	 his	endurance,	as	a	man	suffering	both	mentally	and	physically	for	the	pursuit	of	knowledge.		The	ideological	shaping	of	Darwin’s	later	career	talks	to	a	wider	bourgeois	preference	in	the	early	to	mid-Victorian	period	for	lachrymose	respectability,	one	that	publicly,	at	least,	occluded	gelastic	 narratives	 even	when	 these	were	 enjoyed	 in	 camera.3	 These	muted	codes	of	affect	also	helped	forge	the	formal,	public	character	of	science	itself	in	the	middle	of	the	nineteenth	century,	co-mingling	with	self-denying	asceticism	to	present	an	image	of	 Darwin,	 as	 sober	 secularist,	 embodying,	 as	 Gowan	 Dawson	 has	 shown,	 all	 the	
                                                        Gruyter	&	Co,	1997,	chapter	two.	3	While,	for	example,	George	Henry	Lewes,	famously	professed	to	admiring	George	Eliot’s	“fun”	in	her	first	work	of	fiction	“The	Sad	Fortunes	of	the	Reverend	Amos	Barton”	(1858),	it	was	her	“pathos”	that	he	ultimately	plumped	for	(Haight	212).	Both	Eliot	and	Lewes	“cried	 together”	 over	 scenes	 of	 Milly	 Barton’s	 deathbed,	 a	 marital	 act	 of	 affective	communion	that	is	tacitly	invoked	when	Eliot	published	the	short	story	in	her	collection	of	novellas,	Scenes	of	Clerical	Life	 (1858).	Her	narrator	directly	addresses	her	 readers	with	the	words,	“I	wish	to	stir	your	sympathy	with	commonplace	troubles—to	win	your	tears	for	real	sorrow”	(46).	The	emphasis	on	“real	sorrow”	connotes	sympathy’s	peculiar	grammar	of	affect.	As	Beer	comments	in	Darwin’s	Plots,	Victorian	novelists,	like	Dickens	and	Gaskell,	“sought	to	physically	affect	their	reader:	we	are	to	laugh	and	weep	as	we	read	[…	]	and	to	be	physiologically	disarranged	by	the	reading	experience”	(Darwin’s	Plots	41).	
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seriousness-ness	of	a	Victorian	evangelical	but	with	none	of	the	belief	(Darwin,	Literature	
and	Victorian	Respectability	14).	Richly	suggestive	work	in	this	vein,	most	notably,	Paul	White’s	 “Darwin	 Wept:	 Science	 and	 the	 Sentimental	 Subject”,	 and	 Jim	 Endersby’s	“Sympathetic	 Science:	 Charles	 Darwin,	 Joseph	 Hooker	 and	 the	 Passions	 of	 Victorian	Naturalists”	consider	how	the	mature	Darwin	and	his	fellow	scientists,	T	H	Huxley	and	Joseph	Hooker—who	all	tragically	lost	young	children	through	illness—were	involved	in	discreet	 gentlemanly	 circuits	 of	 mourning.	 These	 private	 experiences	 acted	 as	 both	scientific	and	affective	exchange,	modifying	their	engagement	with	the	public	sphere	but	also,	 significantly,	 their	 professional	 practice.	 The	 sympathy	 reproduced	 in	 letters	 of	condolence,	and	private	scenes	of	weeping	tacitly	fed	into	scientific	observation,	White	notes,	remodelling	it	from	the	inside	out.	The	experience	of	loss	occasioned	reflection	on	the	“nature	of	grief,	its	mechanisms	and	its	causes”	(“Darwin	Wept”	199).		The	sacrificial	labour	of	science	is	also	the	notable	theme	of	George	Levine’s	Dying	
to	Know:	Scientific	Epistemology	and	Narrative	in	Victorian	England	(2002)	which	argues	that	transliterated	theological	traditions	of	self-abnegation	produced	an	epistemological	enterprise	with	a	“powerful	moral	valence”:			It	 is	good	 to	 know,	 and	 therefore	 the	 enterprise	 of	 knowing—even	 against	 the	initiating	 myth	 of	 the	 fall	 into	 knowledge—is	 a	 good	 enterprise	 […]Beyond	beginnings	and	endings,	in	the	very	middle	of	the	activity	of	knowing,	there	is	the	injunction	of	self-sacrifice:	to	sacrifice	anything	and	everything,	particularly	one’s	own	desires,	in	order	to	know	(20).		While	Levine	argues	that	the	“heroic”	Baconian	project	of	letting	“nature	speak	for	itself”	produced	 “utter	 humility”	 sometimes,	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	 “Faustian	 goals”	 these	 often	depended	not	only	on	a	Cartesian	deferral	and	displacement	of	the	self,	but	on	an	actively	punitive	 attitude	 to	 physicality	 (49).	 Careful	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 such	 corporeal	effacements	 are	 not	 the	 only	 tradition	 within	 Victorian	 science,	 Levine	 nonetheless	depicts	 a	 world	 where,	 for	 many	 Victorian	 practitioners,	 the	 pursuit	 of	 knowledge	“entailed	a	radical	distrust	of	the	body	and	a	sacrifice,	rather	like	death,	of	normal	human	desire”	(66).	These	thematics	are	satirically	deployed	in	George	Eliot’s	last	work	of	fiction,	
Impressions	 of	 Theophrastus	 Such	 (1879),	 where	 the	 eponymous	 diarist,	 a	 retired	academic,	 writes	 a	 thesis	 entitled	 “How	We	 Encourage	 Research”	 and	 compares	 the	
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current	age	of	“truth-finding”	to	a	medieval	torture	chamber:	“Some	cruelties	still	pass	for	service	done	in	[truth’s]	honour:	no	thumb-screw	is	used,	no	iron	boot,	no	scorching	of	flesh;	but	plenty	of	controversial	bruising,	laceration,	and	even	lifelong	maiming”	(28).	Increasingly	through	the	century,	the	nightmare	spectre	that	stalks	the	procedural	and	ethical	practices	of	Victorian	science	is	that	subjective	bias	might	taint	and	deform	the	evaluation	of	empirical	evidence.	This	fear	drives	controversies	over	induction	and	deduction	 that	 dominate	 the	 mid-Victorian	 period	 between	 John	 Herschel,	 William	Whewell,	J	S	Mill	and	Auguste	Comte;	debates	which	are	taken	up	in	Lorraine	Daston	and	Peter	 Galison’s	 important	 Objectivity	 (2007),	 where	 they	 suggest	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	“epistemic	 virtue”	 of	 the	 “real”,	 unsullied	 and	 uncorrupted	 by	 the	 personal	 or	 the	idiosyncratic,	 involves	a	 further	 step	 towards	the	 total	 erasure	of	 the	 fleshly	with	 the	emergence	of	the	“blind	sight”	of	“mechanical	objectivity”(16-17).	Seeking	in	objects	such	as	 the	 camera	 (though	 this,	 in	 itself,	 is	 complex)	 a	 form	of	 vision	 divorced	 of	 human	mediation,	mechanical	objectivity	operates	in	opposition	to	previous	regimes	of	looking	proffered	by	natural	philosophers	of	 the	eighteenth	century	who	sought	out	“truth-to-nature”	 and	 representative	 types,	 rather	 than	 the	 attention	 to	 detail	 of	 the	 Victorian	period	(63).		
II.	Reason	&	Un-Reason:	Darwin’s	“Double	Individuality”		Yet	against	these	scientific	mid-Victorian	narratives	that	strain	falteringly	either	towards	post-Cartesianism,	or	else,	a	suffering,	even	tear-stained,	objectivity,	I	want	to	consider	Darwin,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 career,	 and	 not	 at	 the	 end,	 within	 a	 decidedly	 more	embodied,	subjective,	pleasure-seeking	construction	of	the	self	than	the	ones	discussed	so	far;	at	a	moment	when	science	itself	had	not	found	what	Gillian	Beer	calls	a	“stable	professional	dialect”	(“Translation	or	Transformation?”	175).	It	is	significant	that	Daston	and	Galison’s	Objectivity	contains	only	two	mentions	of	Darwin.	They	refer	to	his	“stay-at-home”	scientific	career	and	quote	his	own	account	of	careful	doggedness	in	the	pursuit	of	knowledge	(Objectivity	298,	230).	This	may	suggest	his	sui	generis	place	in	nineteenth-century	science,	but	also	the	 impossibility	of	placing	him	easily	within	an	“objectivity”	narrative.		This	is	a	problem	compounded	by	Darwin’s	own	fugitive	indeterminacy	on	the	subject.	As	Francisco	J.	Ayala	notes,	in	later	life,	and,	as	a	much-honoured	man	of	science,	Darwin	was	keen	to	publicly	emphasize	the	inductive	rather	than	the	deductive	element	
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of	 his	 thinking,	 arguing	 in	 his	 Autobiography	 (1887),	 that	 he	 worked	 from	 data	 and	statistics	first—	“true	Baconian	principles”—and	theory	later	(Ayala	10033;	Barlow	119).	In	private	correspondence,	however,	Darwin	told	a	younger	scientist,	in	1861,	that	you	needed	a	“theory”	against	which	to	measure	your	observations—or	else	you	“might	as	well	go	into	a	gravel-pit	and	count	the	pebbles	and	describe	the	colours”	(Darwin’s	Plots	73;	More	Letters	I:	176).		But	 there	 is	a	 further	complication.	 In	 the	privacy	of	his	home	at	Down	House,	Darwin	advocated	a	decidedly	more	anarchic	approach,	one	that	would	have	received	scant	public	approval	at	any	meeting	of	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science,	but	one	which	Darwin’s	wife	Emma	was	fond	of	quoting:	“It	is	a	fatal	fault	[my	italics]	 to	 reason	 while	 observing,	 though	 so	 necessary	 beforehand	 and	 so	 useful	afterwards”	(qtd.	 in	Richard	D.	Keynes,	 “From	Bryozoans	to	Tsunami”	103).	This	is	an	intriguing	 comment,	 and	 while	 to	 some	 extent	 apocryphal,	 because	 it	 has	 no	 formal	citation	in	Darwin’s	work	or	letters,	it	is	one	that,	if	true,	licenses	a	somewhat	different	reading	 of	 Darwin’s	 exchanges	 with	 the	 natural	 world.	 For	 if,	 as	 Darwin’s	 comment	implies,	 “reason”	 is	 a	 fatality	 during	 observation,	 what,	 then,	 constitutes	 scientific	looking?	 And	 why	 does	 “unreason”,	 privately	 enjoined,	 appear	 to	 be	 so	 essential	 to	Darwin’s	engagement?	I	will	be	suggesting	that	what	Darwin	demonstrates	in	his	years	on	the	Beagle	is	a	kind	of	nonsensical	negative	capability	during	the	act	of	observation,	not	 as	 mere	 weak-minded	 indulgence,	 however,	 but,	 as	 here,	 as	 observational	 and	speculative	necessity.	4	And	while	we	are	used	 to	 interpreting	the	spatial	upturns	and	topic	 destabilizations	 of	 Victorian	 nonsense	 fiction,	 with	 its	 aesthetic	 of	 what	 Jean-Jacques	Lecercle	calls	“ruin[ed]	[…]	seriousness”,	as	a	cultural	response	to	evolutionary	thinking	 (Philosophy	 of	 Nonsense	 192),	 we	 are	 less	 used	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 in	 thinking	through	his	theories,	particularly	in	his	early	encounters	with	animals	during	the	Beagle	years,	 Darwin	 developed	 his	 own	 nonsense	 aesthetic,	 before	 arriving	 at	 what	 John	Herschel	called	the	“law	of	higgledy-piggledy”	(Darwin,	Life	and	Letters	II		241).5	
                                                        4	In	Daniel	Brown’s	The	Poetry	of	Victorian	Science:	Style,	Science	and	Nonsense,	Cambridge	UP,	2013,	he	observes	the	correlation	between	the	ludic	values	of	nonsense	and	that	of	research	science	speculation	in	the	mid-Victorian	period,	particularly	for	the	field	of	physics,	which,	he	asserts,	is	“hemmed	by	nonsense”	with	its	“imperative	for	discovery	and	novelty”	(37).		
5 See	also	Gillian	Beer’s	discussion	of	mathematical	creativity	in	Alice	in	Space:	The	
Sideways	Victorian	World	of	Lewis	Carroll,	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2016,	particularly	chapter	two,	“The	Faculty	of	Invention:	Games,	Play	and	Maths.”	
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The	form	of	constructed	release	from	reason	above	is	again	suggested	in	an	entry	in	 his	M	Notebook,	 as	 Darwin	was	writing	 up	 and	 redacting	 Journal	 of	 Researches	 in	August	1838:		 The	possibility	of	the	brain	having	whole	train	of	thoughts,	feeling	and	perception	separate	 from	 the	 ordinary	 state	of	mind,	 is	 probably	 analogous	 to	 the	 double	individuality	implied	by	habit,	when	one	acts	unconsciously	with	respect	to	more	energetic	 self,	 and	 likewise	one	 forgets.	what	one	 performs	 habitually	 (Charles	
Darwin’s	Notebooks	538).		The	energetic,	even	escapee,	self	that	Darwin	alludes	to	here	suggests	a	larger-than-life	persona	that	belongs	to	a	“double	individuality”	that	both	inhabits,	but	also	breaks	out	of,	habitual	 thought;	 skirting	 the	 boundaries	 of	 reason	 and	 un-reason.	 Darwin’s	consideration	of	ways	to	fix	attention,	and	also	to	access	forms	of	thinking	beyond	the	self,	 were	 key	 issues	 in	 August	 1838	 as	 he	 experimented	 how	 to	 “unbend”	 his	mind	(Charles	Darwin’s	Notebooks	539-541)	to	avoid	over-exertion;	but	also	to	engender	close	focus.	Sometimes,	however,	these	quests	veered	so	far	away	from	the	non-habitual	as	to	be	positively	surprising,	even	madcap.	On	another	August	day	in	1838,	for	example,	he	describes	himself	wandering	aimlessly	around	an	art	exhibition	and	being	so	bored	with	what	he	saw	before	him	that	he	resorted	to	sniffing	the	paintings:		 When	in	the	National	Institution	and	not	feeling	much	enthusiasm,	happened	to	go	 close	 to	one	and	smelt	 the	peculiar	Picture.	 association	with	much	pleasure	immediately	 thrilled	 across	me,	 bringing	 up	 old	 indistinct	 ideas	 of	 Fitzwilliam	Musm.	 I	 was	 amused	 at	 this	 after	 a	 seven	 years	 interval.	 (Charles	 Darwin’s	
Notebooks	539)		Despite	 the	 apparently	 nonsensical	 approach,	 there	 is	 a	 methodology	 in	 Darwin’s	madness:	the	enlivening	and	synesthetic	connection	with	previous	trains	of	thought	and	associations	manages	to	revivify	his	interest.	But	the	link	here	with	a	full-bodied	pleasure	that	“thrill[ed]”	across	him,	even	with	“old	indistinct	ideas”	(another	form	of	“unreason”),	is	an	important	one,	suggesting	the	body—far	from	being	an	entity	to	be	feared,	derided	
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or	 lacerated—is	a	repository	 for	 future	thought.6	This	capacity	of	 the	body	to	act	as	a	fleshly	research	tool	or	what	Pierre	Bourdieu	calls	a	“living	memory	pad”	for	Darwin	as	a	scientist	(a	term	that	didn’t	enter	general	parlance	until	the	twentieth	century)	is,	as	I	will	show,	 most	 clearly	 suggested	 in	 his	 connection	 with	 laughter	 and	 comedy	 (Logic	 of	
Practice	68).7	This	may	be	an	anti-intuitive	claim,	especially	given	the	fact	that	the	best	and	most	authoritative	scholarship	on	Darwin	has	tended	to	assume	and	reinforce	the	image	of	him	as	the	serious,	always-focused	investigator,	the	proper	Victorian	gentleman	and	sage.	But	I	want	to	re-situate	Darwin	as	accessing	the	“double	individuality”	he	talks	of;	not	only	as	a	heterogeneous	reader	in	the	1830s	of	all	those	literary	and	scientific	texts	which	 have	 been	 so	 generously	 discussed	 by	 critics	 in	 the	 last	 thirty	 years,	 from	Shakespeare,	 Montaigne,	 Milton,	 Von	 Humboldt,	 Malthus,	 Dryden,	 Browne	 and	Wordsworth	(to	name	but	a	few),	but	to	connect	him	with	other	forms	of	leisured	and	comic	reading;	reading	that	often	traverses	the	boundary	between	Darwinian	reason	and	un-reason	(Beer,	“Darwin’s	Reading”		549-557;	Levine	Darwin	and	the	Novelists).	This	tactic	risks,	of	course,	over-promoting	the	importance	of	comedy	to	Darwin.	Nonetheless,	 this	paper	 indulges	 in	 the	perhaps	quasi-nonsensical	 and	decidedly	non-habitual	 pleasure	 (like	 Darwin’s	 painting-sniffing	 episode)	 of	 a	 restorative	 critical	thought	 experiment:	 redeeming	 comedy	 and	 laughter	 from	merely	 belonging	 to	what	Robyn	Warhol	has	termed	the	“subnarratable”	(being	deemed	so	vapid	or	banal	that	it	does	 not	merit	 being	mentioned),	 to	 thinking	 how	 it	might	 be	 deployed	 as	 a	 tool	 for	scientific,	and	particularly,	evolutionary	thinking	(“George	Eliot’s	Narrative	Refusals”	51).	The	 “double	 individuality”	 between	 seriousness	 and	 comedy	 is	 invoked	 by	 Darwin	himself	in	another	entry	in	the	M	Notebook	on	the	same	day	in	August	1838,	when	he	was	sitting	in	the	Athenaeum	Club,	reading	two	articles—one	amusing,	the	other	serious—both	of	which	occupied	his	attention	fully.	One	was	David	Brewster’s	review	of	Auguste	Comte’s	Cours	 de	 Philosophie	 Positive	 (1830-42),	 in	 the	 July	 edition	 of	 the	Edinburgh	
Review;	the	other	was	Charles	Dickens’s	Sketches	by	Boz	(1838):	
                                                        6	 And	 indeed,	 an	 entry	 of	 three	 days	 later	 shows	 how	 Darwin	 uses	 this	 physical	experience	to	develop	out	his	theory	as	he	observes	that	a	“child	gains	habit	<<or	trick>>	more	 easily	 than	man,	 so	may	 animal	 obtain	 it	 far	 more	 easily,	 in	 proportion	 to	 the	variableness	or	power	of	intellect”	(Charles	Darwin’s	Notebooks	539).	7	While	 the	 term	was	 coined	 in	 1833	 at	 a	meeting	 of	 the	 British	 Association	 for	 the	Advancement	 of	 Science	 by	William	Whewell	 (in	 opposition	 to	 “artist”),	 it	 didn’t	 gain	currency	till	the	end	of	the	century.	See	Richard	Yeo,	Defining	Science:	William	Whewell	
and	Public	Debate	in	Early	Victorian	Britain,	Cambridge	UP,	1993,	110-11.		
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	 Aug	 12th.	 38.	 At	 the	 Athenaeum	 Club.	 was	 very	 much	 struck	 with	 an	 intense	headache	 <<after	 good	 days	 work>>	 which	 came	 on	 from	 reading	 <<review	of>>M.	 Comte	 Phil.	 which	 made	 me	 <<endeavour	 to>>	 remember,	 &	 to	 think	deeply,	&	the	immediate	manner	in	which	my	head	got	well	when	reading	article	by	Boz	–-now	in	this	I	was	interested	as	I	was	in	the	other,	and	read	so	intently	as	to	be	unconscious	of	all	around,	yet	there	was	no	strain	on	the	intellectual	powers	—	the	difference	is	of	a	man	wagging	his	foot	&	working	with	his	toe	to	perform	some	difficult	task.—(Charles	Darwin’s	Notebooks	539)		As	Beer	observes	about	this	passage:	“The	Comte	gave	him	a	headache.	The	Boz	cured	it”	(“Darwin’s	Reading”	548).	What	is	striking	about	both	metaphors,	of	foot-wagging	and	toe-working,	 is	 how	 they	 figure	 the	 mind	 in	 purely	 physicalist	 terms:	 the	 first,	 foot-wagging,	 suggesting	 an	 intuitive	 flow,	 easily	 according	 with	 the	 natural	 pulses	 and	rhythms	of	the	body;	and	the	second—the	difficult	task	of	reading	a	dense	and	complex	text	about	scientific	method—is	rendered	here	as	almost	a	prehensile	toe,	struggling	and	stretching	to	perform	a	complex	activity	of	deep	thought.8		But	what	 is	more	 significant,	 for	my	 argument,	 is	 that	 unlike	 Kant	 and	 Hegel,	Darwin	 does	 not	 insist	 on	 laughter’s	 subordination	 to	 seriousness;	 but	 rather	 on	 its	equivalence;	 and	also	 its	supple	and	easy	difference.	And	 it	 is	 this	difference,	but	also,	importantly—as	Darwin	acknowledges—its	comparable	aesthetics	of	concentration,	that	I	want	to	pursue	further	to	build	this	double	picture.	For	developing	a	bifocal	approach	to	both	seriousness	and	levity	produces	a	provocatively	alternative	version	of	Darwin,	and	perhaps	even,	of	 the	Victorian	scientific	self.	Another	 instance	of	 this	double-ness	occurs	in	a	letter	to	the	geologist	Charles	Lyell,	again	in	August	1838,	in	which	Darwin	writes	 mercurially	 on	 many	 things,	 including	 his	 first	 field	 trip	 since	 the	 Beagle	expedition	 to	Glen	Roy.	This	would	be	 the	 source	of	what	he	would	 later	 call	his	 “Big	Blunder”	as	David	Amigoni	comments:		
                                                        8	Vanessa,	L	Ryan’s	Thinking	Without	Thinking	in	the	Victorian	Novel,	Johns	Hopkins	UP,	2012,	 has	 valuable	 discussions	 on	 related	 matters,	 particularly	 “unconscious	cerebration”	(29-58)	and	also,	absent	mindedness	(59-104).	
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The	Glen	Roy	formation	and	the	sea-action	thesis	formulated	against	prevailing	theories	 (wrongly	 as	 it	 turned	 out)	 famously	 required	Darwin	 to	 speculate	 on	agencies	and	motive	powers	that	seemed	out	of	place.	Glen	Roy	posed	Darwin	the	problem	of	erratic	rocks,	located	2,200	feet	above	sea	level.	Darwin’s	identity	as	a	geologist	took	him	to	landlocked	gravel	pits	in	an	effort	to	tell	stories	about	sea	shells	and	fossils,	that	due	to	the	present	position	of	the	sea,	were	seemingly	out	of	place	[…]	(“Between	Medicine	and	Evolutionary	Theory”	182)	9		Nonetheless,	 alongside	 the	 pressure	 of	 conjecture,	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 science	 as	“prediction”	 (a	 faculty	which,	 in	 the	 same	 letter,	 he	 told	 Lyell	 he	 admired	 in	 Comte’s	
Cours),	 Darwin’s	 writing	 is	 full	 of	 cheerful	 anecdote	 and	 gossip	 about	 the	 British	Association,	the	Athenaeum,	and	also	about	the	progress	of	a	new	health	regime	of	trying	to	work	 for	 only	 two	hours	 a	 day	 (a	 suggestion	made	 by	 Lyell	 himself).	 And,	 as	 if	 to	underline	the	 latter	point,	Darwin	signs	off	with	a	valediction	to	Lyell’s	wife	about	his	latest	reading:			Tell	Mrs	Lyell	to	read	the	second	series	of	Mr	Slick	of	Slickville’s	sayings	[…]”They	are	dreadful	odd	and	amazing	comical”	as	Mr	Slick	himself	would	say.	—He	almost	beats	“Samivel”	that	prince	of	heroes.	—	Goodnight	my	dear	Lyell.	You	will	think	I	have	been	drinking	some	strong	drink	to	write	so	much	nonsense,	—	but	I	did	not	even	touch	Minerva’s	small	beer	today	(Darwin,	Life	and	Letters	II,	294-5)		There	 is	 a	 certain	 crepuscular	 illogic	 to	 Darwin’s	 late-night	 recommendation	 of	 the	second	edition	of	Thomas	Chandler	Haliburton’s	The	Clock-Maker:	The	Sayings	and	Doings	
of	Samuel	Slick	of	Slickville	(1836-8)	which	may	not	make	this	letter	representative.	But	his	patent	enthusiasm	for	comic	reading	suggests	its	rejuvenating	place	alongside	all	his	other	reading,	and	also,	alongside	the	hard	work	of	speculation,	allowing	him	(again)	to	“unbend	his	mind”	as	he	“builds	his	castles	in	the	air”	(Charles	Darwin’s	Notebooks	547).	But	what	is	also	noteworthy	is	that	the	connection	to	the	comic	also	creates,	by	Darwin’s	own	 admission,	 a	 state	 of	 (entirely	 sober)	 near-intoxication	 about	 his	 relation	 to	 the	world;	 one	 that,	 as	 I	 will	 be	 suggesting,	 is	 both	 attentive	 and	 creative.	 This	 tension	
                                                        9	See	also	Sandra	Gregory’s	discussion	of	Darwin’s	paper	on	the	parallel	roads	of	Glen	Roy	in	Charles	Darwin,	Geologist.	Cornell	UP,	2006,	285-290.	
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between	the	serious	and	comic,	between	restraint	and	freedom,	 is	again	suggested	by	Darwin’s	great-great-grandson	Randal	Keynes,	who	recently	reported	that	even	later	in	life—when	Darwin	complained	that	he	had	lost	all	interest	in	reading	literary	texts	and	feared	he	was	little	more	than	a	“machine	for	grinding	general	laws	out”—	he	still	kept	a	copy	 of	 Mark	 Twain’s	 1865	 humorous	 short	 story	 “The	 Celebrated	 Jumping	 Frog	 of	Calaveras	County”	by	his	bedside	(Autobiography	138-9;	Randal	Keynes).	And	it	is	here,	now,	that	I	want	to	move	the	argument	closer	to	Darwin’s	scientific	method	in	the	Journal	
of	Researches,	and	also	towards	the	vision	of	a	modernity	that	began	this	essay;	and	which	Darwin	helped	to	inaugurate.			
III.	Pickwickian	&	Darwinian	Incongruities		 For	what	unites,	animates	and	indeed	vitalises	many	of	these	“lighter”	texts,	from	Twain’s	story	about	a	betting	man	and	a	leaping	frog	to	Dickens’s	Sketches	by	Boz,	and	
The	Pickwick	Papers	(1836-7)—which	produced	Sam	Weller,	or	the	“glorious	Samivel”—is	 the	 comic	 figure	of	 incongruity,	 a	 style	of	humour	 that,	 as	Daniel	Wickberg	asserts,	increasingly	came	to	stand	for	comedy	itself	by	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	(The	
Senses	of	Humour	8).	To	explain	more	precisely	what	 incongruity	 is,	and	how	it	might	operate	with	regard	to	Darwin’s	scientific	thinking,	I	want	to	go	to	two	main	examples.	The	first	is	a	parodic	vision	of	science	not	getting	the	point	from	Pickwick	Papers;	and	the	second	arises	early	in	Darwin’s	Journal.	As	many	critics	have	discussed,	Pickwick	Papers	(like	Darwin’s	scientific	travelogue)	is	an	inherited	formula,	but	it	also	begins	as	a	spoof	of	science	of	the	1830s:	a	historical	moment	that	provided	rich	pickings	for	the	rollicking	treatment	that	Dickens	so	lavishly	rendered	it.10	 	As	James	Secord	observes,	one	of	the	key	shifts	was	early	Victorian	science’s	changing	institutional	focus:		Old	 institutions	 and	 methods	 of	 understanding	 were	 recast	 and	 new	 ones	developed	that	we	now	see	as	fundamental.	Science	[…]	had	previously	included	all	 theoretically	 grounded	 knowledge—including	 grammar,	 rhetoric	 and	theology;	now	it	was	increasingly	used	to	include	only	the	study	of	nature.	New	institutions	 were	 organised	 for	 conducting	 investigations,	 with	 specialised	
                                                        10	See	also	Dickens’s	burlesque	on	the	British	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Science	in	“The	Mudfog	Papers”	(1837-8),	serialised	in	Bentley’s	Miscellany.		
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facilities	including	batteries,	furnaces	and	other	instruments	for	breaking	things	down	and	combining	them	in	unexpected	ways	(Visions	of	Science	5).11		Science’s	everything-ness	was	slowly	being	replaced	in	the	1830s.12	Even	so,	as	Nancy	Aycock	Metz	suggests,	when	the	amiably	deluded	Samuel	Pickwick	is	first	introduced,	he	emerges	amid	a	“tissue	of	allusions”	to	the	“decline	of	science”:		 “New”	scientists	were	[…]	the	 frequent	butt	of	satire	 from	the	 late	seventeenth	century	to	the	early	nineteenth	centuries,	accused	of	pedantry,	vanity,	gullibility	and	 alienation	 from	 the	 higher	 good	 in	 their	 narrow	 quest	 for	 useless	 and	questionable	 facts.	 When	 Pickwick	 records	 in	 his	 ever-ready	 notebook	 the	“singular	circumstance”	of	a	 forty-two-year-old	horse	kept	out	 for	 two	or	 three	weeks	at	a	time,	Dickens	recalls	a	whole	genre	of	[…]	reportage	[…]	of	“singular	instances”	(“Pickwick	Plumbs	the	Hampstead	Ponds”	284).		 The	problem	about	“singular	 instances”	as	a	style	of	scientific	narrative	 is	their	peripatetic	plot-lessness	and	their	(probable)	scientific	irrelevance.	But	what	also	drives	the	 humour	 in	 the	 excerpt	 above	 is	what	 “science”—as	 represented	 by	Mr	 Pickwick,	whose	recent	paper	on	Tittlebats	in	Hampstead	Pond	had	“agitated	the	scientific	world”	(1)—misses.	To	understand	what	this	is	precisely,	it	is	worth	revisiting	the	scene	where,	with	notebook	anxiously	in	hand,	Pickwick	interviews	an	increasingly	suspicious	London	cabman	about	his	horse’s	“veakness”:											 	“How	old	is	that	horse,	my	friend?”	enquired	Mr	Pickwick,	rubbing	his	nose	with	the	shilling	he	had	reserved	for	the	fare.	“Forty-two,”	replied	the	driver,	eyeing	him	askant.	“What!”	ejaculated	Mr	Pickwick,	laying	his	hand	upon	his	note-book.	The	driver	reiterated	his	former	statement.	Mr	Pickwick	looked	very	hard	at	the	man’s	face,	but	his	features	were	immoveable,	so	he	noted	the	fact	down	forthwith.	
                                                        11	Nancy	Aycock	Metz,	“Pickwick	Plumbs	the	Hampstead	Ponds,”	284.	12	Dickens	spoofs	the	BAAS	as	the	“Mudfog	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	Everything”	with	Professors	Snore,	Doze	and	Wheezy	as	presiding	aegises. 
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“And	how	long	do	you	keep	him	out	at	a	time?”	inquired	Pickwick,	searching	for	further	information.	“Two	or	three	weeks,”	replied	the	man.	“Weeks!”	said	Pickwick	in	astonishment—and	out	came	the	notebook.	“He	lives	at	Pentonwil	when	he’s	at	home,”	observed	the	driver,	coolly,	“but	we	seldom	takes	him	home	on	account	of	his	veakness”	“On	account	of	his	weakness;”	re-iterated	the	perplexed	Mr	Pickwick.	“He	always	falls	down	when	he’s	took	out	of	the	cab,”	continued	the	driver,”	but	when	he’s	in	it,	we	bears	him	up	werry	tight,	and	takes	him	in	werry	short,	so	as	he	can’t	werry	well	fall	down,	and	we’ve	got	a	pair	o’	large	precious	wheels	on:	so	ven	he	does	move,	they	run	after	him	and	he	must	go	on—he	can’t	help	it.”	Mr	Pickwick	entered	every	word	of	this	statement	in	his	note-book	with	the	view	of	 communicating	 it	 to	 the	 club,	 as	a	 singular	 instance	of	 the	 tenacity	of	 life	 in	horses,	under	trying	circumstances	(Pickwick	Papers	7-8).		In	Pickwick’s	earnest	but	po-faced	enthusiasm	to	consider	a	generalised	abstraction	as	the	outcome	of	this	exchange—	“a	singular	instance	of	the	tenacity	of	life	in	horses	under	trying	circumstances”—he	neglects	a	far	more	fundamental	structural	relation	produced	by	incongruity:	that	the	carriage	is	holding	the	horse	up,	rather	than	the	other	way	round.		(And	not	only	that,	but	 the	“pair	o’	 large	precious	wheels”	are	being	used	to	 force	the	horse	to	move	both	spontaneously	and	constantly).	One	of	the	key	aspects	that	makes	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	century	incongruity	theories	more	intellectual	than	previous	theories	of	humour,	like	Aristotelian	or	Hobbesian	superiority	theories,	is	an	inalienable	linkage	with	 perceptual	 strategies.	 In	Book	Two	 of	 John	 Locke’s	An	Essay	 Concerning	
Human	Understanding	(1690)	he	asserts	that	any	judgement	must	depend	on	“the	clear	discerning	faculty	of	the	mind	where	it	perceives	two	ideas	to	be	the	same	or	different”	(123).	The	real	judgement	comes,	however,	as	Michael	Billig	suggests,	in	separating	out	things	that	appear	to	be	the	same	but	actually	are	different	(Laughter	and	Ridicule	62-3).	This	is	what	eludes	Pickwick	when	he	reaches—with	too	solemn	alacrity—for	his	notebook.		An	understanding	of	incongruity	here,	on	the	other	hand,	would	have	taken	the	horse’s	plight	from	being	one	of	type	to	singularity.	But	Pickwick’s	“veakness”	is	also	science’s	“veakness”,	as	Dickens	presents	it	here.	Yet	what	science,	or	indeed	any	kind	of	system-building	 misses,	 is	 also	 a	 redolent	 theme	 in	 Søren	 Kierkegaard’s	 Concluding	
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Unscientific	Postscript	(1846).	In	this,	he	proffers	an	extended	consideration	of	the	kinds	of	incongruity	that	abound	in	both	Dickens	and	Darwin,	including	rendering,	at	one	point,	a	 prolonged	 footnote	 across	 numerous	 pages	 on	 the	 subject.13	 One	 Kierkegaardian	episode,	 in	 particular,	 resembles	 one	 of	 the	 less	 violent	 drinking	 stories	 told	 by	 the	Pickwick	Club:		[A]	barefoot	peasant	[…]	comes	to	town	and	makes	so	much	money	that	he	can	afford	 to	buy	new	shoes	and	stockings	and	still	have	enough	money	 left	 to	get	drunk.	On	the	way	home,	inebriated,	he	lies	down	in	the	middle	of	the	road	and	falls	asleep.	He	is	awoken	by	the	driver	of	a	passing	carriage	who	tells	him	if	he	doesn’t	move,	the	carriage	will	run	over	his	legs.	Looking	down	at	the	unfamiliar	shoes	and	stockings,	the	peasant	replies:	“Go	ahead,	they’re	not	my	legs”	(qtd.	in	Lippitt	149).		As	 John	Lippitt	 suggests,	 “the	 tendency	 to	 relate	 ‘objectively’	 to	 issues	 that	 are	properly	 engaged	 with	 ‘subjectively,’	 	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 first	 person,	 is	 a	 key	 theme	 of	
Postscript”	(Lippitt	163).	And	these	often	concern	 life	at	 the	boundaries	of	knowledge,	where	 Socratic	 limits	 are	 encountered	 and	 challenged.	 Unlike	 his	 more	 secular	contemporaries,	 Kierkegaard	 regarded	 Christianity	 itself	 as	 a	 fundamentally	 comic	religion,	embodying	the	the	greatest	example	of	incongruity	of	them	all:	that	God	entered	human	time	to	save	to	humanity	(Lippitt	151).	But,	as	 I	want	 to	discuss	now,	 it	 is	 the	incongruity	 that	God	never	entered	human	 time	at	 all	which	 is	what	many	Victorians	were	attempting	to	process.		In	considering	incongruity’s	place	in	a	developing	Victorian	secularity,	this	essay	goes	against	the	grain	of	current	scholarship.	The	focus	of	much	recent	New	Historicist	study	between	literary	and	scientific	circles	has	been	on	the	workings	of	analogy.	Devin	Griffiths’s	 important	 study	 The	 Age	 of	 Analogy:	 Science	 and	 Literature	 Between	 the	
Darwins	(2016)	traces	the	application	of	analogy	as	a	means	of	giving	shape	to	scientific	thinking	 which	 has	 yet	 no	 name,	 and	 also	 as	 a	 rhetorical	 device	 for	 naturalising	
                                                        13	I	am	grateful	for	Lippitt’s	illuminating	article	“Humour	and	Irony	in	the	Postscript”	in	
Kierkegaard’s	Concluding	Unscientific	Postscript:	A	Critical	Guide,	149-169;	and	also	Rick	Anthony	Furtak’s	Introduction	(1-5)	to	the	same	edition.	See	also	Thomas	C	Oden,	The	
Humour	of	Kierkegaard:	An	Anthology.	Princeton	UP,	2004	(10-12,	77-79).	
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abstractions	that	seem	strange	or	alien.	In	tracing	analogy’s	role	in	promoting	scientific	thought	 in	wider	social	 and	 scientific	networks,	Griffiths	argues	 for	 the	 importance	of	“comparative	 historicism”	 as	 a	 model	 for	 introducing	 novelty	 while	 asserting	 its	historical	continuity	between	past	and	present	(Age	of	Analogy	1-50).	Using	this	template,	we	can	more	fully	appreciate	the	rhetorical	poise	of	Darwin’s	famous	analogy	of	domestic	pigeons	 and	man-made	 breeder	 selection	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 invisible,	 and	 far	more	threatening,	workings	of	natural	selection	in	The	Origin	of	Species	(1859).	Yet	while	Origin	promised	“one	long	argument”	this	statement	of	apparent	rhetorical	smoothness	belies	the	a-historical	fits	and	starts	that	got	Darwin	to	that	point	(Origin	357).	And	it	is	here	that	 I	 argue	 that,	what	 incongruity	 induces	 (unlike	 the	workings	 of	 analogy),	 is	not	 a	comforting	continuation	with	the	past,	but	a	radical,	though	often	temporary,	rupture	of	historicity,	 associated	with	 the	 immanence	 of	 a	 troubled	 present,	 and	 even,	 future:	 a	radical	form	of	epistemological	breakage.		In	1872,	an	anonymous	writer	on	incongruity	in	the	British	Quarterly	describes	its	effects	thus:	“It	is	as	if	a	partition	wall	in	our	intellect	was	 suddenly	 blown-out,	 two	 things	 formerly	 strange	 to	 one	 another	 have	 flashed	together”	(qtd.	in	Dickensian	Laughter	98).																																																														To	begin	to	consider	how	Darwinian	incongruity	operates	in	the	Journal,	I	want	to	compare	the	example	of	Kantian	and	Dickensian	incongruities	that	began	this	paper,	to	a	moment	in	October	1833,	when	Darwin,	as	part	of	his	five-year	journey	through	South	America,	 the	Galapagos	 Islands,	 Australia	 and	New	Zealand,	 heads	 through	Argentina	from	Santa	Fe	towards	Buenos	Aires,	 in	search	of	a	Toxodon’s	 tooth.	 It	was	a	 journey	which	Darwin	began	in	much	excitement,	to	pair	up	two	teeth	that	belonged	to	the	same	enormous	prehistoric	jawbone.	He	procured	a	canoe,	and	with	the	help	of	local	guides,	proceeded	to	the	place	where,	as	he	had	been	told,	the	remains	of	some	“old	giants”	had	been	seen	on	the	banks	of	the	Parana:		 	Two	groups	of	immense	bones	projected	in	bold	relief	from	the	perpendicular	cliff.	They	were,	however,	so	completely	decayed	that	 I	could	only	bring	away	small	fragments	of	one	of	the	great	molar-teeth;	but	these	were	sufficient	to	show	that	these	belonged	to	a	species	of	Mastodon.	The	men	who	took	me	in	the	canoe,	said	they	had	long	known	of	them,	and	had	often	wondered	how	they	had	got	there:	the	 necessity	 of	 a	 theory	 being	 felt,	 they	 came	 to	 the	 conclusion,	 that	 like	 the	bizcacha,	the	mastodon	formerly	was	a	burrowing	animal!	(147).	
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	At	first	glance,	this	scene	appears	like	another	episode	of	Kantian	superiority	dressed	up	incongruity.	Darwin	is	apparently	amused	initially	by	the	naiveté	of	his	guides.	Yet	the	impetus	of	this	joke	is	fundamentally	different	to	Kant’s,	and	to	Pickwick’s,	because	firstly,	Darwin	recognises	the	incongruity;	but	also	because	the	structuring	animus	of	the	joke	involves	the	incongruous	apparition	that	an	enormous	bulky	creature	like	a	mastodon,	complete	with	huge	tusks,	might	(like	the	small	rabbit-like	bizcacha)	have	once	been	a	burrowing	animal.	This	thought	is	registered	only	with	an	exclamation	mark	by	Darwin,	but	acts	as	a	mise	en	abyme	of	the	operations	of	incongruity,	burrowing	away	in	what	will	become	his	evolutionary	imagination;	but	also	demonstrating	that	incongruity,	like	the	Gothic,	acts	here	as	a	visual	aesthetic	that	accesses	depth.		In	the	only	works	to	consider	the	effect	of	incongruity	on	scientific	thinking,	Arthur	Koestler’s	Act	of	Creation	(1964),	and	later	iterations	of	his	key	themes,	he	describes	the	effects	of	incongruity,	or	what	he	calls	“bisociation”:			 It	 is	 a	 sudden	 clash	 [or	 “delightful	 mental	 jolt”]	 between	 […]	 two	 mutually	exclusive	 codes	of	 rules—or	associative	 contexts	 […]which	produces	 the	 comic	effect.	 It	 compels	 us	 to	 perceive	 the	 situation	 in	 two	 self-consistent	 but	incompatible	 frames	 of	 reference	 at	 the	 same	 time;	 it	 makes	 us	 function	simultaneously	on	two	different	wave-lengths	[…]	(“Joking	Apart”	328)			The	functioning	on	two	levels	recalls	the	“double	individuality”	of	Darwin’s	M	Notebook,	but	unlike	Koestler’s	historically	generalist	approach,	it	is	central	to	my	argument	that	incongruity’s	 greatest	 impact	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 specifically	 nineteenth	 century	phenomenon.	Learning	a	new	grammar	of	Victorian	incongruity	will	allow	us	to	chart	an	important	new	taxonomy	of	affect	in	the	period,	particularly	with	regard	to	evolutionary	thought	(Brennan,	Ahmed).			 But	to	understand	the	significance	of	incongruity	as	depth	is	to	appreciate	firstly	its	 excessive	 comic	 localism	 in	 scientific	 thinking;	 an	 internal	 self-reflexivity	 which	figures	 in	 Darwin’s	 multiple	 accounts	 of	 “amusements”	 in	 the	 Journal,	 but	 also	 in	Schopenhauer’s	famously	un-amusing	joke	in	The	World	as	Will	and	Representation	Vol	II	about	the	“smile”	caused	by	the	sight	of	a	parabola	bisected	by	a	line:		
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Bearing	in	mind	that	for	an	angle	two	lines	meeting	each	other	are	required	which	when	produced	intersect	each	other;	that	the	tangent,	on	the	other	hand,	touches	the	circle	only	at	one	point	but	at	this	point	really	runs	parallel	to	it;	and	if	we	thus	have	present	in	our	mind	the	abstract	conviction	of	the	impossibility	of	an	angle	between	the	circumference	of	a	circle	and	the	tangent,	but	yet	have	such	an	angle	visibly	before	us	on	paper,	all	this	will	easily	make	us	smile	(92).			While	 this	 has	 been	 derided	 for	 extreme	 aridity,	 what	 it	 also	 suggests,	 somewhat	paradoxically,	 is	 the	 essential	 creativity	 of	 incongruity	 garnered	 by	 long	 periods	 of	looking;	a	version	of	scientific	looking	that	militates	against	the	emptied	out	persona	of	Daston	and	Galison’s	“mechanical	objectivity.”	A	recent	edition	of	the	Journal	of	Brain	and	
Cognition	(2014)	asked	why	a	bird	on	an	ear	was	more	stimulating	to	a	viewer	than	a	bird	in	a	bird-house.14	Yet	the	capacity	to	appreciate	incongruity	is,	I	propose,	largely	based	on	 the	 visual	 accomplishment	 and	 experience	 of	 the	 observer;	 and	 not	what	 is	 being	observed.	 It	 is	 for	 this	reason	that,	 for	example,	 the	myopic	Pickwick,	despite	“staring	hard”	 at	 the	 cabman,	 failed	 to	 put,	 as	 it	 were,	 the	 cart	 before	 the	 horse.	 While	Schopenhauer	does	freely	acknowledge,	in	the	example	given	above,		that	the	spirit	of	the	ludicrous	is	“feeble”,	this	model	of	studious	subjectivity,	not	objectivity,	is	a	valuable	one,	that	 I	 want	 to	 pursue	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 visual,	 ontological	 and	 phenomenological	experience	of	incongruity	in	the	Journal;	one	that	has	particular	significance	for	Darwin’s	interspecies	imagination.																																																																																				*	The	key	signifier	of	incongruity	in	the	Journal	(operating	as	a	kind	of	visual	snagging)	is	the	word	“amusement”:	cognates	of	which	appear	over	forty	times.	The	Oxford	English	
Dictionary	defines	“amusement”,	multiply	as	an	“idle	time-wasting	diversion”,	and	also	“recreation”,	 but	 increasingly,	 the	 word	 is	 modified	 by	 the	 Victorians	 and	 most	interestingly,	by	Darwin	himself.	While	“amusement”	was	often	used	as	the	antonym	of	“instruction”	in	the	Useful	Knowledge	debates	of	the	early	to	mid-nineteenth	century,	it	bore	for	the	blood-and-guts	loving	Georgians	something	of	the	meaning	of	“sport”	(Rauch	1-21).	W	M	Thackeray,	for	example,	in	1855,	bemoaned	the	loss	of	the	“amusements”	of	his	youth,	 referring	 to	 the	harsher	Georgian	sports	of	badger	baiting	and	 fox	hunting,	
                                                        
14 See	Florence	Remy.	“Incongruent	Object/Context	Relationship	in	Visual	Scenes:	Where	Are	They	Processed	in	the	Brain?”	Brain	and	Cognition.		vol	84.	Issue1,	Feb	2014:	34-43.	
 20 
which	 he	 complained	 had	 been	 “improved	 out	 of	 all	 existence”	 (“Four	Georges”	 377).	Darwin,	as	partial	Georgian	but	also	proto-Victorian	uses	“amusement”	in	a	distinctively	more	progressive	and	definitively	temporal	sense	to	“sport”.		 The	word	inheres	a	number	of	key	points	in	observational	time;	beginning	with	the	first	laugh,	an	often	involuntary	response	of	finding	something	“amusing”—a	visual	economy	 of	 noticing	 which	 bears	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 expectation	 and	 reality.	“Amusement”	 for	 Darwin,	 then,	 in	 this	 instance,	 is	 the	 height	 of	 an	 elater	 beetle’s	springing	jump	(35),	or	how	a	Graspus	crab	craftily	steals	the	fish	of	nesting	sea-birds	(10),	 or	 the	 “impetuous	manner”	 in	which	 a	 “heap”	 of	 basking	 seals	 “tumble	 into	 the	water”	(346)	as	Darwin’s	boat	goes	by;	or	the	dramatic	manner	of	giant	tortoises,	who	pull	in	their	heads,	hiss	and	“fall	to	the	ground	[…]	as	if	struck	dead”	as	he	is	walking	past	them	(465).	Mihaly	&	Isabella	Csikszentimihalyi	suggest	that	creative	“flow”	or	“optimal	experience”	occurs	as	the	subject	becomes	immersed	in	their	world,	losing	all	sense	of	time	and	ego	(“The	Flow	Experience”	15-35).	This	occurs	in	a	scene	in	January	1832	when	Darwin	is	playing	“cat	and	mouse”	with	a	cuttlefish	on	the	shores	of	the	Atlantic.		This	 cuttlefish	 displayed	 its	 chameleon-like	 power	 both	 during	 the	 act	 of	swimming	and	whilst	remaining	stationary	at	the	bottom.	I	was	much	amused	by	the	various	arts	used	to	escape	detection	used	by	one	 individual,	which	seemed	fully	aware	that	I	was	watching	it.	Remaining	for	a	time	motionless,	it	would	then	stealthily	advance	an	inch	or	two,	like	a	cat	after	a	mouse;	sometimes	changing	its	colour:	it	thus	proceeded,	till	having	gained	a	deeper	part,	it	darted	away,	leaving	a	dusky	train	of	ink	to	hide	the	hole	into	which	it	had	crawled.	While	looking	for	marine	animals,	with	my	head	about	2	feet	above	the	rocky	shore,	I	was	once	more	saluted	by	a	jet	of	water	[…]	(7)			The	 mock	 contest	 with	 the	 cuttlefish	 stresses	 horizontality	 rather	 than	 verticality,	culminating	in	the	comic	indeterminacy	of	Darwin	presented	here	as	losing.	What	is	also	noteworthy	though	is	the	nature	of	Darwin’s	attention,	pacing	out	time,	second	by	second,	as	 he	 remains	 momentarily	 “motionless”,	 and	 waits	 for	 the	 response	 and	 counter-response	of	the	cuttlefish.	A	few	lines	later,	still	hoping	to	catch	sight	of	the	cuttlefish	after	it	has	disappeared	in	a	“dusky	train	of	ink”,	Darwin	is	to	be	found	scoping	out	the	coastline	with	his	head	“2	feet	above	the	rocky	shore”	in	search	of	the	animal.	It	is	at	this	moment	
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that	 the	 cuttlefish,	 hidden	 behind	 rocks,	 takes	 his	 “revenge”	 and	 Darwin	 finds	 he	 is	“saluted	by	a	jet	of	water”	(46).		But	I	want	to	linger	on	the	bending	figure	of	the	laughing	scientist	at	the	scene	of	observation.	For	what	this	resembles	is	not	the	Cartesian	fantasy	of	absolute	detachment	but	 rather	more,	 the	 description	 of	 G	H	 Lewes’s	 accounts	 of	Dickens’s	 observation	 as	“hallucination”:	where	an	object,	much	studied,	seems	to	loom	out	before	the	viewer,	and	take	on	a	life	of	its	own.	As	Lewes	suggests:		[I]n	 no	 other	 perfectly	 sane	mind	 [than	 Dickens]	 have	 I	 observed	 vividness	 of	imagination	so	closely	approaching	hallucination	[…]	To	Dickens	revived	images	have	 the	 vividness	 of	 sensations;	 to	him	 also	 created	 images	 have	 the	 coercive	force	 of	 realities,	 excluding	 all	 control,	 all	 contradiction.	 What	 seemed	preposterous,	impossible	to	us,	seemed	to	him	simple	fact	of	observation.	When	he	imagined	a	street,	a	house,	a	room,	a	figure,	he	saw	it	not	in	a	vague	schematic	way	of	ordinary	 imagination,	but	 in	 the	 sharp	definition	of	 actual	perception,	 all	 the	salient	 details	 obtruding	 themselves	 onto	 his	 attention.	 […]	 He	 seeing	 it	 thus	vividly	he	made	us	see	it	[…]	He	presented	it	in	such	relief	that	we	ceased	to	see	it	as	a	picture.“			(“Dickens	in	Relation	to	Criticism”	145)16		But	then,	sometimes,	there	is	not	much	to	differentiate	this	depiction	of	vividness	from	Darwin’s	observational	practice.		At	one	point,	for	example,	while	travelling	across	St	Cruz	in	Patagonia	in	December	1833,	Darwin	can	be	found	lying	on	his	back,	waving	his	hands	and	feet	in	the	air,	attempting	to	attract	the	attention	of	a	passing	herd	of	grazing	animals:	“That	[the	guanacos]	are	curious	is	certain;	for	if	a	person	lies	on	the	ground,	and	plays	strange	antics	[my	italics],	such	as	throwing	his	feet	up	in	the	air,	they	will	almost	always	
                                                        16	The	relation	between	what	Lewes	calls	“vividness”	and	“hallucination”	depends	here	on	how	far	rationality	tempers	the	imagination:	both	in	relation	to	“revived”	images,	which	translate	to	modern-day	“flashbacks”,	but	which,	in	Lewes’s	account	of	Dickens,	are	rendered	in	a	highly	physicalized	way;	and	also	with	“created”	images,	where	an	abstract	thought	is	visualised,	but,	is	summoned	forth	in	Dickens’s	prose,	as	if	with	the	force	of	concrete	reality.	(“Dickens	in	Relation	to	Criticism”	145).	For	further	accounts	of	Lewes’s	diverse	attitudes	to	Dickens’s	work,	see	Nicholas	Dames,	The	Physiology	of	
the	Novel:	Reading,	Neural	Science	and	the	Form	of	Victorian	Fiction,	Oxford	UP,	2007,	182-5.	
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approach	by	degrees	to	reconnoitre	him”	(195-6).17	Here,	there	is	a	playful	reciprocity	about	 who	 is	 observing	whom,	 with	 the	 llama-like	 guanaco,	 in	 Darwin’s	 description,	tentatively	approaching	and	showing	as	much	curiosity	in	the	foot-waving	oddity	before	them	as	the	naturalist	does	in	them.			 	In	another	instance,	much	quoted	by	biographers,	Darwin	watches	while	a	land	iguana	in	the	Galapagos	buries	itself	into	a	hole,	before	going	up	to	it	and	pulling	its	tail:		 This	animal	when	excavating	its	burrow,	alternately	works	the	opposite	sides	of	its	body.	One	front	leg	for	a	short	time	scratches	up	the	soil,	and	throws	it	towards	the	hind	foot,	which	is	well	placed	so	as	to	heave	it	beyond	the	mouth	of	the	hole.	The	side	of	the	body	being	tired,	the	other	takes	up	the	task,	and	so	on	alternately.	I	watched	one	for	a	long	time,	till	half	its	body	was	buried;	then	I	walked	up	and	pulled	it	by	the	tail;	at	this	it	was	greatly	astonished,	and	soon	shuffled	up	to	see	what	was	the	matter;	and	then	stared	me	in	the	face,	as	much	as	to	say,	“What	made	you	pull	my	tail?”		(470)			The	tail	yanking	displays	a	playful	vitality	and	larcenous	mischief	that	helped	make	the	
Journal	an	unexpected	publishing	success	in	the	1840s,	and	since.	Yet	the	question	“What	made	you	pull	my	tail?”	signifies	a	moment	of	self-reflexivity	in	the	Journal,	one	that	is	worth	considering	further,	both	in	the	light	of	the	politics	of	research	transcription,	and	in	 the	 wider	 context	 of	 scientific	 exploration	 narratives.	 As	 Milena	 Kozic	 observes,	redacting	any	type	of	research	data	presents	a	number	of	methodological	challenges	and	editorial	choices	(“Notes	on	Nothing”	60).	The	negotiations	made	during	the	writing-up	process	operate	as	a	kind	of	theory	in	themselves	(Ochs,	“Transcriptions	as	Theory”	43-72)	 but	 they	 also	 veer—because	 of	 their	 essentially	 formative	 nature—between	 both	representation	 and	 interpretation,	 requiring	 “selective	 re-contextualization”	 that	highlights	or	obscures	elements	of	 the	research	 interaction	(Green	et	al.	268;	Baldry	&	Thibault).	The	question	that	arises	then,	is	not	only	what	made	Darwin	pull	the	iguana’s	tail—but	by	what	emphases	and	relevancies	did	he	construct	a	scientific	narrative	that	included	such	instances?		
                                                        
17 Members	of	Darwin’s	crew	also	perform	“strange	antics”	with	the	guanaco	too. 
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It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that	 the	 lizard’s	 “question”	 is,	 in	 21st	 century	 terms,	scientifically	 inadmissible,	 and	 signifies	 one	 of	 many	 moments	 of	 Darwinian	anthropomorphism	 in	 the	 Journal,	 the	 mental	 state	 attribution	 of	 animals	 as	psychologically	 like	 himself,	 which	 operates	 as	 an	 outmoded	 nineteenth-century	intellectual	framework;	one	that	falls	into	the	category	of	“failed	heuristics”	or	what	the	editors	 of	 Anthropomorphism,	 Anecdotes	 and	 Animals	 describe	 as	 “delightfully	embarrassing”	 (427).	Embarrassing	or	not,	however,	while	 “play	 cues”	 like	 tail-pulling	might	suggest	this	part	of	the	text	“need	not	be	taken	seriously”,	they	point	rather	more	suggestively	to	an	alternative	logic—or	rather,	a	performative	illogic—in	operation;	one	that	 reformulates	 Darwin’s	 research	 thinking	 through	 a	 dynamic	 process	 of	 laughing	engagement	with	the	world	around	him	(McGhee,	Humour:	Its	Origin	and	Development	1-20).			
IV.	Towards	A	Methodological	Tickling		
	When	Darwin	discussed	 the	 “ludicrous”	and	 the	 “ridiculous”	 in	The	Expressions	of	 the	
Emotions	 in	Man	 and	 Animals	 (1872),	 he	would	 deploy	 the	 suggestive	 analogy	 of	 the	“tickling”	of	the	“mind”	to	discuss	laughter’s	effects	on	the	thinking	and	feeling	self:	“The	imagination	is	sometimes	said	to	be	tickled	by	a	ludicrous	idea;	and	this	so-called	tickling	of	the	mind	is	curiously	analogous	with	that	of	the	body,”	he	notes	(201).	Tickling	can	be	violent	or	 it	 can	be	mild,	 it	 can	 cause	all	 kinds	of	bodily	excrescences	and	 temporary	mental	 incapacities,	 and	 even	 insanities,	 but,	 according	 to	 Darwin,	 it	 must	 also	 be	experienced	in	a	pleasurable	state,	or	else,	it	becomes	something	else:			 Laughter	from	a	ludicrous	idea,	though	involuntary,	cannot	be	called	a	strictly	reflex	action.	In	this	case,	and	in	that	of	laughter	from	being	tickled,	the	mind	must	be	in	a	pleasurable	condition;	a	young	child,	if	tickled	by	a	strange	man,	would	scream	from	fear	(201).		In	addition	to	a	lack	of	fear,	a	defining	aspect	of	the	mental	and	physical	“tickle”	for	Darwin	is	that	it	cannot	be	self-inflicted.	Theorizing	that	just	as	children	cannot	tickle	themselves,	so,	says	Darwin,	a	mind	cannot	be	tickled	by	anything	other	than	an	external	stimulus.	And	it	is	here	that	we	see	the	cognitive	potency	in	Darwin’s	account:	he	underscores	the	
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instrumentality	of	the	“ludicrous”	and	the	“ridiculous”,	specifically	in	terms	of	its	power	to	engage,	process	and	react	to	the	intellectually	novel:			 From	the	fact	that	a	child	can	hardly	tickle	itself,	or	in	a	much	less	degree	than	when	tickled	by	another	person,	it	seems	that	the	precise	point	to	be	touched	on	must	 not	 be	 known;	 so	 with	 the	 mind,	 something	 unexpected—a	 novel	 or	
incongruous	idea	which	breaks	through	a	habitual	train	of	thought	[my	italics]—appears	to	be	a	strong	element	in	the	ludicrous.	(200)			The	capacity	of	Darwinian	laughter	to	“break	through”	habitual	thinking	is	what	I	want	to	pursue	further;	deploying	Michael	J.	Apter	and	K.	C.	P.	Smith’s	theory	of	telic	and	paratelic	activity.	 In	 their	 important	essay,	 “Humour	and	the	Theory	of	Psychological	Reversals”	(1977),	 they	distinguish	between	two	models	of	subjectivity;	 the	 first,	 telic,	 is	oriented	towards	a	particular	goal,	with	any	other	experience,	 like	pleasure	or	 laughter,	 taking	secondary	importance	to	the	outcome	of	the	activity.	Against	this,	is	paratelic	activity,	in	which	sensation	and	enjoyment	are	the	most	important	part	of	any	experience,	with	the	idea	of	any	eventual	goal	being	subsidiary	(95-100).	Taking	both	these	purposive	and	non-purposive	models,	I	want	to	consider	two	kinds	of	laughter	in	the	Journal,	re-deploying	words	from	Darwin’s	own	vocabulary,	“sport”	and		“amusement”	as	signifiers	of	the	telic	and	paratelic	laughter,	respectively.		It	is	one	of	the	notable	features	of	the	Journal	that	as	well	as	regarding	animals	as	subjects	for	enquiry,	and	also	as	objects	of	admiration—	“the	little	owls	of	the	Pampas	[…]	standing	like	sentinels”	(82)—he	also	regards	them	as	competitive	quarry	to	be	shot,	or	 as	 food,	 beyond	 their	 status	 as	 potential	 specimens.	 Indeed,	 some	 of	 the	 most	remarkable	moments	 bear	 on	 its	 sudden	 shifts	 in	 viewpoint	 and	 orientation	 towards	animals.	Darwin	talks	admiringly,	for	example,	about	the	South	American	agouti,	a	shy	mammal	that	resembles	a	hare,	which	he	observes,	“generally	produces	two	young	ones	at	birth,	which	are	brought	forth	within	the	burrow”	(82).	The	language	here,	“brought	forth”,	poetically	invokes	the	agouti’s	burrow	as	something	of	a	domestic	idyll,	and	yet,	in	the	very	next	line,	the	tone	has	shifted	completely:	“The	flesh,	when	cooked,	is	very	white:	it	is,	however,	rather	tasteless	and	dry”	(82).	This	sudden	transformation	in	the	animal’s	status,	from	admired	parent	to	lunch,	unintentionally	produces	the	kind	of	bleak	humour	that	would	 find	 its	way	 into	Lewis	Carroll’s	Through	the	Looking	Glass	 (1872)	with	 its	
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death	jokes	and	concerns	about	being	snuffed	out—“Bang!	just	like	a	candle!”	(Looking	
Glass	 ch.4).	 This	 unstable	 taxonomy	of	 affect	 is	 also	 observable	 in	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	scenes	of	the	Journal,	in	Rio	De	Janeiro	in	1832,	when	Darwin	goes	hunting	with	an	“old	Portuguese	 priest”	 and	 a	 “wild	 Brazilian	 youth”	 (Journal	 32;	 Brennan	 5).	 As	 Darwin	describes,	“the	sport	consisted	in	turning	into	the	cover	a	few	dogs,	and	then	patiently	waiting	 to	 fire	 at	 any	 animal	 that	 might	 appear”	 (32).	 The	 indiscriminate	 nature	 of	Darwin’s	hunting	trip	(“any	animal”)	is	striking	here	but	so	is	how	the	scene	concludes:	the	shoot	proves	disappointing	and	produces	little	more	than	“some	sundry	small	green	parrots	 and	 a	 few	 toucans”	 (32),	 but	 during	 this	 same	 expedition,	 Darwin	 and	 his	companions	 come	across	a	 large	dead	bearded	monkey,	 shot	 the	day	before,	which	 is	discovered,	rather	gruesomely,	still	hanging	upside-down	by	its	prehensile	tail	in	a	tree.	The	monkey	must	be	cut	down	and	thuds	cumbrously	to	 the	 forest	 floor	but	 the	dead	animal,	 suspended	 and	 supine,	 acts	 metonymically	 for	 one	 mode	 of	 looking	 (among	many)	in	the	Journal,	where	animals	are	treated	as	passive	and	inert	signifiers	through	the	prism	of	“sport”.		“Sport”	also	has	comic	dimensions	and	stands	for	some	coercive,	even	exploitative,	forms	 of	 looking—where	 Darwin,	 as	 the	 naturalist-circus	 master	 or	 whip-hand—	instrumentalizes	 animals	 as	 two-dimensional	 signs,	 or	 stooges,	 to	 illustrate	 some	particular	feature	of	the	world	he	is	encountering:	the	remoteness	of	the	seabirds’	world	at	St	Paul’s	Rock,	where	he	imagines	killing	“any	number”	of	nesting	boobies	and	noddies	with	his	geological	hammer	(9);	or	the	tameness	of	a	hawk	in	the	Galapagos,	which	he	pushes	off	a	branch	with	the	muzzle	of	his	gun	(475);	or	 the	“hereditary	 instinct”	of	a	fearful	iguana	when	Darwin	is	repeatedly	hurling	it,	“as	far	as	[he	is]	able”,	into	the	deep	pool	 created	 by	 a	 retiring	 sea-tide.	 (468).	 Part	 of	 the	 investigation	 with	 the	 iguana	involves	 exploring	 the	 nature	 of	 habitual	 and	 non-habitual	 thought—“fixed	 and	hereditary	 instinct”—but	 it	 also	 becomes	 mechanically	 and	 even	 grimly	 repetitive	(468).18	A		similar	instance	of	scientific	explorers	“besting”	animals	can	be	found	in	the	ubiquitously	caricatured	anecdote	of	the	Yorkshire	taxidermist	Charles	Waterton,	bare-handedly	wrestling	with	a	15-foot	Cayman,	in	order	to	take	it	home	stuffed	and	unmarked	
                                                        18	While	this	is	not	intended	to	be	humorous,	it	does	resemble	Henri	Bergson’s	later	memorable	definition	of	the	comic,	as	“something	mechanical	encrusted	on	the	living”	(Laughter	84).	See	Michael	Billig’s	engaging	discussion	of	the	limitations	of	Bergson’s	idea	of	comedy	based	on	“bodily	clumsiness.”	(Laughter	and	Ridicule	111-138).			
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to	his	country	house	in	Wakefield.	Such	moments,	as	Victoria	Carroll	has	argued	in	Science	
and	 Eccentricity,	were	 increasingly	 a	 regular	 feature	 of	 the	 sensationalism	of	 popular	science	in	the	1820	and	1830s	(Carroll	2).	Yet	while	many	critics	have	attentively	observed	Darwin’s	sense	of	wonder	in	the	
Journal	 (Amigoni,	 Levine,	 Beer,	 Schmitt,	 Browne),	 what	 is	 decidedly	 more	 difficult	 to	taxonomize	 is	 these	 “lighter”	moments,	often	 considered	as	not	quite	part	of	 scientific	knowledge-making.	 Yet	 the	 reason	 why	 we	 treat	 these	 moments	 as	 essentially	ornamental,	 or,	 as	 Nicholas	 Ridout	 calls	 them,	 “side	 affects”,	 rather	 than	 purposive,	suggests	 a	 proclivity	 to	 think	 only	 in	 heroic	 terms	 about	 scientific	 creativity	 and	 the	pursuit	of	knowledge	(Stage	Fright	160).	Useful	here	is	Connor’s	assertion	that:			Human	beings	have	a	deep	narcissistic	attachment	to	 the	act	of	 thinking,	which	they	 sometimes	 think	 of	 as	 pure	 consciousness.	 They	 think	 that	 thinking	something	gives	it	the	power	of	being	thought	about,	even	by	proxy	[…]	but	actually	attention	is	distraction	(“Mixed	Bodies”	3).		The	suspension	of	extrinsic	self-awareness	and	attentive	inattention	that	Connor	posits	is	one	 that	 talks	 to	 the	 condition	 of	 dynamic	 and	 active	 thinking	 suggested	 by	Darwin’s	“unreason”	that	began	this	paper.	But	amusement	also	proffers	an	affective	missing	link	to	 Daston	 and	 Galison’s	 account	 of	 scientific	 thinking	 in	 Objectivity,	 one	 that	 both	challenges	and	also	supplements	their	construction	of	the	libidinally	frigid	mode	of	will-centred	 scientific	 looking	 that	 they	 argue	 emerged	 in	 the	Victorian	 period	 (Objectivity	229).	Distinguishing	between	the	eighteenth	century	scientist	who,	as	an	enthusiastic	and	sensation-bound	savant	 is	overly	 subject	 to	 “beautiful”	but	 “counterfeit”	 systems,	 they	argue	the	emergence	of	a	newly	disciplined	scientific	self	patrolled	by	“regulative	ideals”	propounded	 in	 Victorian	 biographies	 and	 hagiographies	 of	 scientists	 through	 the	nineteenth	century	(231).	This	battle	between	objectivity	and	subjectivity	is	staked	out,	like	a	“psychodrama”	in	scientific	journals	and	biographies:			 Both	artistic	and	scientific	personas	spawned	heroic	myths,	albeit	complementary	ones.	 The	 heroic	 artist	was	 authentic,	 recreating	 the	world	 in	 the	 image	 of	 the	assertive	and	the	indelible	self.	The	heroic	scientist	was	disciplined,	discovering	the	world	through	work	(Objectivity	246-7).	
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	Yet	Darwin’s	decidedly	un-heroic	 laughter	posits	 a	mode	of	 engagement	and	attentive	looking	that	does	not	easily	 fit	 into	the	emotional	circuitry	of	 increasingly	prescriptive	high	Victorian	mythology.	But,	like	the	“tickling”	of	the	brain	recounted	in	Expressions,	this	gelastic	condition	tells	of	a	particular	susceptibility	to	the	world	beyond	the	self,	one	that	is	neither	intellectually	off-duty	or	less	engaged	in	the	scene	of	observation,	but,	as	in	the	scene	with	 the	 cuttlefish,	more	 engaged	 in	 a	 state	 of	 cognitive	 and	 affective	 “arousal”	(Smith	 and	 Apter	 96).	 Significantly,	 however,	 Darwin’s	 paratelic	 laughter,	 far	 from	consolidating	the	will	of	the	Victorian	scientist—as	in	Objectivity’s	account—often	figures	the	breakage	of	that	will,	suggesting	the	possibility	of	future	reformulations.	For	 Darwin	 is,	 like	 Pickwick,	 surprisingly	 often,	 the	 comic	 bungler.	 Take	 the	moment	in	Argentina,	in	July	1832,	when,	while	out	horse-riding	and	practising	using	an	American	bolas,	he	manages	 to	 lasso	his	own	horse’s	 legs	 in	 front	of	 laughing	Gaucho	cowboys:		One	day	as	 I	was	amusing	myself	by	galloping	and	whirling	 the	balls	 round	my	head,	by	accident	the	free	one	struck	a	bush;	and	its	revolving	motion	being	thus	destroyed,	it	immediately	fell	to	the	ground,	and	like	magic	caught	one	hind	leg	of	my	 horse;	 the	 other	 ball	 was	 then	 jerked	 out	 of	my	 hand,	 and	 the	 horse	 fairly	secured.	Luckily	he	was	a	practised	animal;	and	knew	what	it	meant;	otherwise	he	would	 probably	 have	 kicked	 until	 he	 had	 thrown	 himself	 down.	 The	 Gauchos	roared	with	laughter;	they	cried	that	they	had	seen	every	sort	of	animal	caught,	but	had	never	before	seen	a	man	caught	by	himself	(51).		 The	“amusement”	here	where	Darwin	not	only	nearly	unseats	himself,	but	is	also	saved	by	the	quick	thinking	of	the	horse,	owes	much	to	a	distinctive	and	long-standing	tradition	in	theatre	based	exclusively	on	failure	and	horseplay.	In	a	compelling	discussion	of	“fiasco”,	a	feature	drawn	from	commedia	dell’arte,	in	which	clowns	fail,	fall,	stumble	and	falter,	Nicholas	Ridout	describes	a	 state	of	 “ludicrous	 collapse”	 in	a	 theatre	where	 the	performer	realizes	that,	through	a	gradual	escalation	of	laughter	between	the	stage	and	audience,	that	he	has	“nothing	to	offer”	(148).	The	British	comedian	Tommy	Cooper,	as	Ridout	notes,	 in	his	ground-breaking	 study	Stage	Fright,	Animals,	 and	Other	Theatrical	
Problems,	made	an	entire	career	out	of	such	flops,	as	the	Magic	Circle	magician	who	could	
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not	“do”	magic,	and	his	stage	performance	(“the	stumbling	and	aimless	wandering,	 the	irruption	 onto	 the	 scene	 of	 stage	 or	 floor	 managers	 and	 the	 barrage	 of	 incomplete,	unfunny	jokes	and	bungled	punch	lines”)	recalls	Darwin’s	behaviour	here	(149).		Like	Cooper,	Darwin’s	lack	of	“competence”	on	the	horse	is	in	danger	of	exposing	the	workings	 behind	 the	 façade,	while	 the	 infectious	giggling	 signals	 a	 potent	 state	 of	hyper-permeability	 that	 becomes	 almost	 masochistic,	 causing	 him	 to	 lose	 his	 amour-
propre.	While	there	are	undoubted	homosocial	implications	to	the	way	Darwin	“catches	himself”	in	front	of	the	“roaring”	cowboys,	what	is	more	striking	here	is	Darwin’s	apparent	complicity,	like	Cooper’s,	in	his	own	subjective	dismantling—his	willingness	to	“queer”	his	 own	 scientific	 text	 through	 laughter.	 Darwin’s	 joyous	 and	 epiphanic	 state,	 being	“saved”	by	his	horse,	is	productive	of	new	kinships	and	affinities—the	play	community,	as	Johan	 Huizinga	 suggests,	 lasts	 long	 after	 the	 game	 is	 finished,	 but	 these	 textual	embarrassments	also	adumbrate	the	way	that	body	and	mind	are	co-opted	by	into	new	modes	of	thinking	and	un-thinking	(Homo	Ludens,	chapter	six).	Darwin	is	again	“unseated”	on	the	Galapagos	Islands,	attempting	to	climb	on	the	backs	of	giant	tortoises.			 I	frequently	got	on	their	backs	and	upon	giving	a	few	raps	on	the	hinder	part	of	the	shell,	they	would	rise	up	and	walk	away;	but	 I	 found	 it	very	difficult	 to	keep	my	balance.	(465)		The	comedy	arises	from	the	collision	of	timeframes	between	the	zestful	young	scientist	with	 new	worlds	 to	 explore,	 and	 a	 story	 to	 uncover,	 and	 the	 cumbrous	movement	 of	antediluvian	 “monsters”	 from	 deep	 time	 being	 drafted—not	 necessarily	 unwillingly	according	to	this	account—into	Darwin’s	japes.	Playfulness	morphs	into	burlesque	and	self-mockery	when,	deploying	grandiose	gestures	that	ape	the	colonial	panjandrum	on	his	elephant,	 Darwin	 struggles	 to	 keep	 his	 balance	 and	 falls	 off.	 As	 Judith	 Halberstam	comments	 in	The	Queer	Art	of	Failure,	 not-winning	 “allows	us	 to	escape	 the	punishing	norms	that	discipline	behaviour”	leading,	potentially,	to	an	“ecstatic	exposure”	of	power	dynamics,	which	are	“undermined	from	within”	(3-5).	In	another	mock-heroic	failure,	the	ghosts	of	past	assumptions	and	future	methodologies	enter	the	textual	scene	even	before	the	laughter	has	subsided.	At	Port	Desire,	in	Patagonia,	in	1833,	Darwin	realizes	that	he	has	 lost	a	rare	specimen	of	bird—a	particular	species	of	petise—but	then	finds	he	has	mistakenly	eaten	it	for	lunch:	
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	When	at	Port	Desire	in	Patagonia	(lat.48)	Mr	Martens	shot	an	ostrich;	and	I	looked	at	 it,	 forgetting	 at	 the	 moment,	 in	 the	 most	 unaccountable	 manner,	 the	 whole	subject	of	the	Petises,	and	thought	it	was	the	two-thirds	grown	one	of	the	common	sort.	The	bird	was	cooked	and	eaten	before	my	memory	returned.	Fortunately,	the	head,	neck,	legs,	wings,	many	of	the	larger	feathers,	and	a	larger	part	of	the	skin,	had	 been	 preserved.	 From	 these	 a	 very	 nearly	 perfect	 specimen	 has	 been	 put	together	[…](108-9)		While	Darwin	finds	himself	“stuffed”	as	a	comedy	farceur	here,	the	humour	stems	from	the	confusion	over	taxonomies	of	bird	as	food	and	bird	as	find.	Unlike	the	horse	and	bolas	instances,	or	the	fall	from	the	giant	tortoises,	the	collapse	of	Darwin	as	man	of	science	here	is	not	total—he	does	not	quite	depict	himself	picking	bits	of	bird	out	of	his	teeth;	but	the	humour	 is	 overcast	 by	 a	 certain	 neophyte	 shame.	 Indeed,	 what	 is	 striking	 is	 the	atmosphere	of	almost	self-betrayal	as	Darwin,	in	a	 tone	of	abject	bathos,	castigates	his	own	vision	and	mind,	as	he	remembered	eating	the	bird:	“I	looked	at	it,	forgetting	at	the	moment,	 in	 the	most	unaccountable	manner”.	Laughter,	here,	 as	elsewhere,	 involves	a	comic	effacement	of	Darwin’s	autonomy	and	developing	methodology,	while	the	use	of	the	word	“unaccountable”	suggests	an	alternative,	and	even	secretive,	economy	at	work,	over	which	he	is	not	fully	in	control.	As	Freud	suggests,	one	of	the	features	of	a	joke	is	that	it	feels	original—as	if	it	“occurred	involuntarily”	and	came	from	nowhere	(The	Joke	and	
Its	 Relation	 to	 the	 Unconscious	164).	 The	 post-lunch	 carnage	 is	 resolved,	 however,	 as	Darwin	retrieves	the	bones	and	painstakingly	puts	them	back	together	before	sending	the	skeleton	of	what	would	become	a	new	classification,	the	rhea	darwinii,	back	to	Henslow	in	Cambridge	(Journal	of	Researches	109).	But	 I	 want	 to	 connect	 Halberstam’s	 notion	 of	 “failure	 from	within”	 to	 Ridout’s	expansion	of	the	term	“fiasco”,	deploying	the	work	of	Simon	Bayly	to	consider	further	the	possible	research	impetus	of	Darwin’s	comedic	lapses	and	effacements.	“Fiasco”,	explains	Bayly,	is	a	dramatic	form	derived	probably	from	the	seventeenth	century	archaic	Italian	glass	bottle	“Bologna”,	which	does	not	break	if	raised	up	very	high	in	the	air	and	dropped	on	the	ground—but	does	break	when	some	smaller	objects	are	inserted	into	it,	and	then	dropped	 (Bayly	 22-3;	 Ridout	 150).	 “Fiasco”	 had	 currency	 in	 the	 1820s	 and	 1830s	 as	meaning	 a	 theatrical	 disaster	 but	 also	 operates	 suggestively	 to	 describe	 a	 form	 of	
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embodied	thinking	that	cracks	“from	within”	in	a	process	Bayly	calls	“auto-disintegration”	(23):		 With	this	phenomenological	observation	fiasco	acquires	a	sense	of	a	breaking	up	that	is	a	breaking	out.	Weakness	and	fragility	are	revealed	in	a	structure	otherwise	durable	and	resilient,	happening	from	the	inside	out	rather	than	from	the	outside	in	(23).		In	 “breaking	up	 that	 is	 a	breaking	out”,	 the	potency	of	 fiasco	 in	Darwin’s	 evolutionary	thinking	can	be	seen.	For,	in	addition	to	the	seriousness	of	his	pursuits,	the	assiduity	of	his	 note	 taking,	 the	 breadth	 of	 disciplinary	 fields	 he	 traversed	 (from	 geology	 to	anthropology	to	botany	and	physical	sciences),	and	the	inclusive	nature	of	his	writing	to	a	heterogeneous	audience,	there	are	also	the	giggles,	the	physical	pratfalls,	the	wobbles	and	the	 japes:	and	these	add	up	to	something.	They	are	not,	 in	Kant’s	 terms,	“nothing”	(161).	 And	 while	 historians	 of	 science,	 and	 biographers,	 and	 any	 number	 of	 general	readers,	have	enjoyed	 and	 relished	 these	 stories	merely	as	examples	of	 charming	and	delightful	anecdotalism,	their	influence	can	be	seen	as	considerably	more	potent	and	far-reaching.	 In	 the	 gradual	 build	 and	 build	 of	 Darwin’s	 thinking,	 via	 a	 series	 of	 comic	accretions	and	impedimenta,	they	re-focus	Darwin’s	curiosity,	his	scholarly	attention	and	his	methodology.	Using	his	body	as	a	testing	ground,	even	a	makeshift	laboratory	for	his	non-teleological	 thinking,	 Darwin	moves	 fluently	 and	 fluidly	 between	 contrasting	 and	incongruous	comic	modes:	the	heroic	and	the	un-ideal,	the	purposive	and	the	accidental,	the	 epic	 and	 the	 trivial.	 Through	 the	 lexicon	 of	 fiasco,	 cracking	 the	grand	 narrative	 of	Biblical	creation	is	not	achieved	with	a	mighty	coup	de	grâce,	but	through	a	series	of	small,	often	seemingly	incidental,	but	nonetheless	meaningful	internal	reformations.	As	Bayly	elaborates	further:		 [Fiasco]	 is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 the	 disastrous	 and	 spectacular	 impact	 of	 two	 solid	bodies	contacting	each	other	via	their	external	surfaces	but	rather	of	a	process	by	which	one,	much	smaller,	body	finds	its	way	into	the	invaginated	side	of	the	other	and	encounters	its	inner	surface	(Pathognomy	of	Performance	23).		
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Laughter	in	the	Journal	of	Researches	provides	the	means	through	which	Darwin	“enters”	his	research	world.	It	acts	as	both	agent	provocateur,	the	inciting	factor,	and	provides	the	first	 crucial	 stages	 in	 Darwin’s	 later	 theorizing.	 It	 is	 the	 character	 of	 “amusement”	 to	reformulate	thinking	that	explains	perhaps	its	surprising,	even	spectral,	presence	in	the	passage	 from	 Darwin’s	 Autobiography,	 when	 he	 first	 conceives	 his	 theory	 of	transmutation:		In	October	1838,	that	is,	fifteen	months	after	I	had	begun	my	systematic	inquiry,	I	happened	 to	 read	 for	amusement	 [my	 italics]	Malthus	on	Population,	 and	being	well	prepared	to	appreciate	the	struggle	for	existence	which	everywhere	goes	on	from	 long-continued	 observation	 of	 the	habits	 of	 plants	 and	 animals,	 it	 at	 once	struck	me	under	these	circumstances	favourable	variations	would	be	preserved,	and	unfavourable	ones	to	be	destroyed.	The	result	of	this	would	be	the	formation	of	 new	 species.	 Here,	 then,	 I	 had	 at	 last	 got	 a	 theory	 by	 which	 to	 work.	(Autobiography	120)		Debates	about	eureka-ism	or	 inductivism	have	dominated	 interpretation	of	 this	passage,	 but	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 a	 slightly	 different	 focus.	 The	 language	 of	 “systematic	inquiry”	appears	to	work	in	contradiction	to	Darwin’s	description	of	reading	Malthus	for	“amusement”.	While	 this	suggests	either	the	bleakest	of	 ironies	or	else,	 the	opposite,	a	desultory	even	dilatory	engagement	with	his	subject,	 the	word	appears	decidedly	odd,	and	perhaps	even	inappropriate,	in	this	context.	Stephen	Jay	Gould	has	complained	that	this	scene,	written	years	 later	 in	 the	Autobiography,	 is	not	quite	accurate	and	does	not	tally	 with	 what	 is	 written	 in	 the	 notebooks	 of	 the	 1830s	 (The	 Panda’s	 Thumb	 64-7).	Nonetheless,	what	is	noticeable	here	is	that	Darwin,	writing	years	after	the	event	as	an	elder	statesman	of	the	scientific	academy,	unwittingly	portrays	one	of	the	most	powerful	moments	in	his	own	intellectual	life,	and	indeed	that	of	the	modern	world,	through	that	sense	 of	 the	 pleasurable	 breakage,	 break-through	 and	 re-assemblage	 conferred	 by	incongruous	“amusement”.			***		 Back	in	London	in	1838,	Darwin	conducted	an	unusual	laughter	experiment:		
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Looking	at	one’s	face	whilst	laughing	in	glass	and	then	as	one	ceases,	or	stops	the	noise,	the	face	clearly	passes	into	smiles	–	laugh	long	prior	to	talking,	hence	one	can	help	speaking,	but	laughing	involuntary	(565,	Transmutation	Notebook	N	6	qtd.	in	Rosenberg	137.)		Particularly	noteworthy	here	is	Darwin’s	placidity	in	the	face	of	his	laughing	reflection.	A	scene	 that	 elsewhere	 in	 Victorian	writing	might	 precipitate	 a	 crisis	of	 self-division,	 is	greeted	 by	 Darwin	 with	 equanimity,	 as	 he	 phlegmatically	 describes	 hearing	 the	undifferentiated	 “noise”	 of	 his	 laughter	 recede.	 In	 place	 of	 Bakhtinian	 grimaces	 or	uncanny	musings,	Darwin	describes	a	“face	that	clearly	passes	into	smiles.”	The	apparent	transparency	 towards	 the	 potential	 stranger	 in	 the	 mirror	 is	 arresting.	 John	 D.	Rosenberg’s	reading	of	this	passage	notes	a	complete	absence	of	the	“self-objectification”	and	 “self-enchantment”	 to	 be	 found	 in	 autobiographic	 forms	 (“Mr	 Darwin	 Collects	Himself”	 137).	 The	 act	 of	 staring	 at	 one’s	 own	 image,	 potentially	 “the	 defining	 act	 of	narcissism”,	as	Rosenberg	asserts—and	the	kind	that	saw	Gwendolen	Harleth	kiss	her	own	reflection	in	Daniel	Deronda	(1876)—is	replaced	here	with	an	apparently	singular	act	of	self-effacement;	an	affective	 lacuna	that	Rosenberg	associates	with	cold-hearted	scientific	 methodology	 (Deronda	 13;	 Rosenberg	 137).	 But	 while	 Rosenberg	 observes	coolness,	he	is	also	scrupulous	to	observe	that	there	is	something	of	a	contradiction	in	his	own	logic:	that,	even	in	later	life,	and	despite	Darwin’s	own	avowals	to	the	contrary,	he	retained	 “intensity	 of	 feeling”	 (137).	 This	 leaves	 Darwin’s	 laughter	 caught	 between	 a	methodological	 rock	 and	 a	 hard	 place.	 Can	 it	 really	 be	 the	 result	 of	 non-feeling	rationalism,	a	dispassionate	and	purely	objective	engagement—but	if	so,	where	to	place	Darwin’s	obvious	enthusiasm	and	enduring	pleasure?		A	crucial	aspect	of	the	scene	here	is,	I	think,	that	Darwin	“laughs	long”	and	that	the	laughter	is	“involuntary.”	This	is	not	a	bloodless	laugh.	Rather,	it	suggests	laughter	as	an	alternative	form	of	signification	and	meaning	making	in	Darwin’s	thinking,	and	in	Victorian	life,	one	that	contains	within	it	a	profoundly	intellectual,	and	indeed	sympathetic,	engagement	with	the	world	beyond	the	self.		
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